Multiparty computation (MPC) among n parties can tolerate up to t < n/2 active corruptions in a synchronous communication setting; however, in an asynchronous communication setting, the resiliency bound decreases to only t < n/3 active corruptions. We improve the resiliency bound for asynchronous MPC (AMPC) to match synchronous MPC using non-equivocation.
INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is an important primitive in distributed systems. Informally, in a system of n mutually distrusting parties, an MPC protocol allows the parties to "securely" evaluate any agreed-on function f of their private inputs, in the presence of a centralized active adversary A, controlling at most any t out of the n parties. In the synchronous communication model, where the message transfer delays are bounded by a known constant, the MPC problem has been studied extensively (e.g., [10, 18, 27, 36, 40] ). In practice, there is growing interest in generalizing MPC to an asynchronous communication model [9, 14, 17] that does not place any bound on the communication delays. The weaker restrictions on the adversary in the asynchronous model not only worsen the required resiliency conditions and communication complexities, but also make designing protocols a more challenging task; intuitively this is because in a completely asynchronous setting, it is not possible to distinguish between a slow (but honest) sender and a crashed sender. Due to this, at any "stage" of an asynchronous protocol, no party can afford to wait to hear from all the parties and so the communication from t (potentially honest) parties may be ignored [17] . Due to their complexity, only a few asynchronous MPC (AMPC) protocols are available [5, 9, 11, 20, 31] .
In this work, we focus on an asynchronous model with a computationally bounded adversary A, where the parties are connected by pairwise authenticated links. In this setting, AMPC protocols are possible if and only if t < n/3 [30, 31] . This is in contrast to the synchronous world, where we can tolerate up to t < n/2 corruptions [29] . Interested in bridging this gap in the resilience, Beerliová-Trubíniová, Hirt and Nielsen [7] observed that it is possible to design an AMPC protocol tolerating t < n/2 corruptions in a "partial" synchronous network. More specifically, assuming one synchronous broadcast round at the beginning of the protocol, where each party can synchronously broadcast to every other party, they designed an AMPC protocol tolerating t < n/2 corruptions. Due to the availability of the synchronous broadcast round, their protocol could also ensure "input provision", i.e. the inputs of all the (honest) parties are considered for the computation, which otherwise is impossible to achieve in an asynchronous protocol [17] . Nevertheless, their requirement of one synchronous broadcast round per MPC instance may not always be realizable: deterministic broadcast protocols [24] require Θ(t) rounds of communication over the pairwise channels or randomized broadcast protocols [25, 39] require O(1) (with a large constant) expected rounds of communication. It was left as an open problem in [7] to see whether one can design an AMPC protocol with t < n/2 under other simplified assumptions.
In distributed computing research, a similar problem with asynchronous protocols has recently been addressed by introducing a small trusted hardware assumption [21] [22] [23] [32] [33] [34] . In particular, it was shown that, the resilience of asynchronous distributed computing tasks such as reliable broadcast, Byzantine agreement, and state machine replication (SMR) can be improved using a small trusted hardware module at each party. The hardware module utilized is just a trusted, increment-only local counter and a signature oracle, which can be realized with pervasively available trusted hardwareenabled devices. Using such trusted hardware with each party, one can design asynchronous reliable broadcast tolerating up to t < n active faults [22, 23] , and asynchronous Byzantine agreement (ABA) and SMR protocols tolerating up to t < n/2 [21, 33, 34] active faults, all of which otherwise require t < n/3 [39] .
At a conceptual level, such a trusted module makes it impossible for a corrupted party to perform equivocation, which essentially means making conflicting statements to different (honest) parties. The use of signatures (or transferable authentication) complements non-equivocation (i.e., making equivocation impossible) by making it transferable as required in the asynchronous communication environment. Clement et al. [22] generalized the results [21, 23, 34] and proved that non-equivocation with signatures (or transferable non-equivocation) allows treating Byzantine faults as crash faults for many distributed computing tasks. In particular, they present a generic transformation that enables any crash-fault tolerant distributed protocol to tolerate the same number of Byzantine faults using transferable non-equivocation. However, their generic transformation considers only the basic distributed computing requirements of safety and liveness. It does not apply to cryptographic tasks such as AMPC where confidentiality (or privacy) of inputs is also required. This presents an interesting challenge to assess the utility of transferable non-equivocation for the task of AMPC.
Contribution and Comparison
We study the power of transferable non-equivocation in the context of AMPC and demonstrate how to improve the resilience of AMPC from t < n/3 to t < n/2, without any synchrony assumption. In particular, we present a general MPC protocol in a completely asynchronous communication model with n ≥ 2t + 1. Our protocol, called NeqAMPC , improves upon the previous AMPC protocol [7] with n ≥ 2t + 1 in the following ways: (a) Simplified assumptions. Our AMPC protocol needs a transferable non-equivocation mechanism, but unlike [7] neither makes a synchronous broadcast round assumption nor requires a threshold homomorphic encryption setup. Given the feasibility of realizing transferable non-equivocation over prevalent computing devices, we argue that transferable non-equivocation is a more practical assumption than the synchronous broadcast round assumption. (b) Efficiency. For a security parameter κ, our AMPC protocol requires an amortized communication complexity of O(n 3 κ) bits per multiplication gate, which improves upon the AMPC protocol of [7] by a factor of Θ(n).
To reduce the setup assumptions for the NeqAMPC protocol, we avoid the traditional threshold additive homomorphic encryption based circuit evaluation approach as used in [7, 31] . Instead, we employ a secret-sharing based circuit evaluation approach [10, 18, 36] , where privacy of the computation is maintained via secret sharing. Nevertheless, as detailed in our protocol overview (Section 2), secret-sharing based AMPC with n = 2t + 1 and O(n 3 κ) communication complexity (per multiplication) presents several interesting challenges. As a result the NeqAMPC protocol is significantly different than those in the literature [5, 7, 31] .
In the process, we also present the first computationally secure asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) [2, 3, 14, 17] scheme for n ≥ 2t + 1 with O(n 2 κ) communication complexity (using transferable non-equivocation), which otherwise requires t < n/3 [17] . Our AVSS scheme has an additional useful feature-it is the first publicly verifiable [38] AVSS scheme, as it allows any third party to publicly verify the "consistency" of the shares. With its efficiency and public verifiability, our AVSS scheme may be of independent interest to other cryptographic protocols.
Comparison with Existing Work. The best known computationally secure AMPC protocols are reported in [7, 31] . The protocol in [31] considers a fully asynchronous setting with t < n/3, whereas [7] assumes one synchronous broadcast round and can tolerate up to t < n/2 corruptions. Both the protocols require a threshold additive homomorphic encryption instantiation, and incur an (amortized) communication complexity of O(n 2 κ) and O(n 4 κ) bits per multiplication gate respectively. 1 We do not employ a threshold encryption setup, but rather prefer a more standard public key encryption setup with the addition of transferable non-equivocation. Our NeqAMPC protocol with t < n/2 performs circuit evaluation by secret-sharing the inputs and incurs a communication complexity of O(n 3 κ) bits per multiplication gate. Nevertheless, by modifying our protocol and employing a threshold encryption setup (coupled with transferable non-equivocation), we can tolerate t < n/2 faults with communication complexity O(n 2 κ) bits per multiplication gate. However, we prefer the secret-sharing based AMPC, as we aim to reduce the assumptions relied upon.
We note that unlike [7] , our AMPC protocol could not enforce input provision: the input from t potentially honest parties may be ignored for computation. As discussed earlier, this is inherent to asynchronous systems and presents a trade-off between our protocol and that of [7] based on what is more important: input provision or avoiding the synchrony assumption. Finally, we note that using a transferable non-equivocation mechanism, one can realize asynchronous reliable broadcast (see Section 3.3) with t < n and consequently get rid of the synchronous broadcast round required in [7] . However, the resultant protocol will still require the threshold homomorphic encryption setup and O(n 4 κ) communication per multiplication, and it will no longer support input provision.
OVERVIEW OF OUR PROTOCOL
Without loss of generality, we assume n = 2t + 1; thus, t = Θ(n). We assume that the function f to be computed is expressed as an arithmetic circuit over the finite field Zp, where p > n is a κ bit prime and κ is the security parameter. The circuit consists of twoinput addition (linear) and multiplication (non-linear) gates, apart from random gates. The AMPC protocol consists of two phases: an input phase and a computation phase. During the input phase, the parties share their inputs, while during the computation phase, the parties jointly evaluate f on the shared inputs and publicly reconstruct the output. Linear gates can be evaluated locally if the underlying secret-sharing scheme is linear; so we use the Shamir secret-sharing scheme with threshold t [37] . We denote a sharing of a value s by Multiplication gates cannot be evaluated locally since multiplying the individual shares results in the underlying sharing polynomial having degree 2t instead of t. Therefore we evaluate multiplication gates using the standard Beaver's circuit-randomization 1 Beerliová-Trubíniová et al. [7] focused on designing a protocol with t < n/2, and the communication complexity of O(n 4 κ) of their protocol (measured by us in the extended version of the paper [1] ) can possibly be improved.
technique [4] . This technique requires three "pre-processed" secretshared values, say ([u] , [v] , [w] ), unknown to the adversary A, such that w = u · v. Given such a shared multiplication triple, and shared inputs of a multiplication gate, say [x] and [y], the multiplication gate is securely evaluated using the equation
In particular, the parties compute the sharings of (x − u) and (y − v), and publicly reconstruct the same. Once (x − u) and (y − v) are public, the parties can compute their shares of x · y, using the above equation and employing linearity of the secret sharing. As u and v are random and unknown to A, the public knowledge of (x − u) and (y − v) does not violate the privacy of x and y.
Pre-processing Phase
Although the idea of our AMPC protocol is the same as the existing information-theoretically secure MPC and AMPC protocols [5, 6, 20] , our major challenge lies in generating the required shared multiplication triples with n = 2t + 1 parties; the existing protocols [5, 6, 20] employ at least n > 3t parties for this purpose 2 . These triplets are independent of the circuit and the inputs of the parties, and generated in an additional pre-processing phase. Generating these triplets efficiently is the important problem we solve in our protocol. In the rest of the section, we give an overview of how (cM +cR) shared random triples are generated, where cM and cR are the number of multiplication gates and random gates in the circuit. As a first step, we describe how a single triple is generated (see Fig. 1 for a pictorial representation of the protocols involved) and then extend this to cM + cR triples. . The parties then agree on a common subset (say Tv) of t + 1 dealers whose Sup-Sh instances will be eventually terminated by all the parties. We set v = P i ∈Tv v (i) . The shared value v will be random and unknown to A, as Tv has at least one honest party. Next, each party Pi is asked to act as a D and invoke a Sup-PreMul-Sh instance to share a uniformly random value u (i) as well as u (i) · v. The parties then agree on a common subset of t + 1 dealers, say Tu, whose Sup-PreMul-Sh instances will be eventually terminated by all the parties. For u = P i ∈Tu u (i) and w = P i ∈Tu u (i) · v, the triple (u, v, w) is a random multiplication triple.
There is, however, an important subtlety: As a precondition, the Sup-PreMul-Sh protocol expects its dealer D to also have encryptions of all n shares of [v] , encrypted under the individual keys of the respective share-holders; here, the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic (and not threshold additively homomorphic). For any sharing, we call a party having such n encrypted shares to be privileged. Due to asynchronicity, the Sup-Sh protocol cannot guarantee that all the n − t honest parties are privileged with respect to every [v (i) ] sharing of Pi ∈ Tv. We solve the problem by ensuring in Sup-Sh that there exists a designated (possibly 2 Shared multiplication triples with n = 2t+1 have been generated in the synchronous setting [12] ; however, their adaptability to the asynchronous setting is unclear. ]. An honest P king then computes all the n encrypted shares of [v] using the homomorphic properties of encryption, and reliably broadcasts them. Using non-equivocation, the required asynchronous reliable broadcast is possible for n > t (Section 3.3). Once P king (correctly) broadcasts the n encrypted shares of v, each Pi can invoke its Sup-PreMul-Sh instance.
The Preprocessing Phase Protocol. Protocol SupTripGen may not terminate for a corrupted P king . Therefore, we ask each party Pi to act as a king and generate shared random multiplication triples under its supervision by invoking an instance of SupTripGen. As the instances of honest kings will eventually terminate, we distribute the load of generating cM +cR shared random multiplication triples among n parties. Each party Pi is asked to act as a king and generate
shared multiplication triples in its SupTripGen instance. The parties then agree on a common subset T king of t + 1 kings whose SupTripGen instances will be eventually completed by everyone and the |T king | ·
= cM + cR shared triples obtained in these instances are considered as the final output.
Sub-protocols for the Preprocessing Phase
We now discuss the realization of the main sub-protocols Sup-Sh and Sup-PreMul-Sh for the preprocessing phase.
Protocol Sup-Sh (Section 5.1). Our Sup-Sh protocol is almost equivalent to the AVSS primitive [3, 14, 17] : it allows a dealer D to "verifiably" share a secret s, thus generating [s], and ensures that at least one honest party is privileged to obtain all the n shares encrypted for the respective share holders. The existing computational AVSS protocols (e.g., [3, 14] ) are designed with n = 3t + 1 and are based on sharing a secret using a bivariate polynomial of degree t in each variable and (homomorphic) commitments. In this paradigm, it is ensured that D has distributed "consistent" shares to n − t = 2t + 1 parties such that (at least) t + 1 honest parties among them can "enable" the remaining parties to get their shares. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be used with n = 2t + 1, as here we can only ensure that D has distributed consistent shares to n − t = t + 1 parties. In the worst case, there will be only one honest party in this set, who may not have sufficient information to help the other honest parties to complete a sharing.
We solve this problem by introducing encryptions of the shares 3 , and by employing univariate polynomials instead of bivariate polynomials. Here, D provides a vector of n encrypted shares as well as homomorphic commitments of those shares to each party. The nonequivocation mechanism is used to ensure that a corrupted D does not distribute different sets of encrypted and committed shares to the different parties. Once n − t = t + 1 parties confirm that they have received "consistent" n encrypted and committed shares, there must exist at least one honest privileged party with all n encrypted shares, who can transfer the individual encrypted shares to the individual parties. Transferability of non-equivocation ensures that corrupted privileged parties do not transfer incorrect encryptions.
Protocol Sup-PreMul-Sh (Section 5.2). The protocol takes as input an existing sharing [v] of a value v unknown to everybody including A, such that all the parties are privileged, i.e., all the parties hold encryptions of all shares. The protocol then allows a dealer D to verifiably share its value u as well as
The protocol ensures that u · v remains secure in general and u is secure for an honest D. The idea behind the protocol is that knowing the encrypted and committed shares of v and employing the homomorphic properties of encryptions and commitments, D can compute the encrypted and committed shares corresponding to u·v for his choice of u, even without knowing v. The dealer can then (non-equivocally) distribute the encrypted and committed shares to the parties. Once it is confirmed that t + 1 parties have received all the n encrypted and committed shares of u · v, it is ensured that there exists a honest privileged party, who can relay the individual encrypted shares of u · v to the respective parties.
We take a more bottom-up approach in the rest of the paper. We describe our model, and define non-equivocation and other primitives in Section 3. We present our AVSS protocol in Section 4. We start our AMPC construction with subprotocols Sup-Sh and Sup-PreMul-Sh in Section 5. We then present our supervised multiplication triple generation in Section 6 and finally describe the complete AMPC protocol in Section 7. Due to space constraints, all proofs are shifted to the extended version [1] .
PRELIMINARIES

Model
We consider a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of n parties connected by pairwise authenticated channels, where n = 2t + 1. These communication channels are asynchronous with arbitrary but finite delay (i.e. the messages sent by the honest parties reach to their destinations eventually). A centralized static adversary A can actively corrupt any t out of the n parties and force them to deviate in any arbitrary manner during a protocol execution. A party not under the control of A is called honest. The adversary A is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm, with respect to a security parameter κ. During a protocol execution, the message delivery order is decided by a scheduler controlled by A. Nevertheless, the scheduler cannot modify the messages exchanged between honest parties.
A protocol execution is considered as a sequence of atomic steps, where a single party is active in each such step. A party is activated upon receiving a message, after which it performs some compu-tation and possibly outputs messages on its outgoing links. The scheduler controls the order of these atomic steps. At the beginning of the execution, each party will be in a special start state. A party is said to terminate/complete the execution if it reaches a halt state. A protocol execution is said to be complete when all honest parties complete it. We assume that every message sent by a party during an execution has a publicly known unique identifier (key) associated with it. We denote the set {y, y + 1, . . . , z} ⊂ N as [y, z].
Definitions
Computationally Secure AVSS. Informally an AVSS scheme consists of two phases, a sharing phase, where a special party called dealer shares a secret and a reconstruction phase, where the parties reveal their shares to reconstruct the secret.
More formally, let (Sh, Rec) be a pair of protocols for parties in P, where a dealer D ∈ P has a private input s ∈ Zp for Sh. Then (Sh, Rec) is an computationally secure AVSS scheme, if the following requirements hold for every possible adversary A, except with a negligible probability in κ:
-TERMINATION: (a) If D is honest and all the honest parties participate in the protocol Sh, then each honest party eventually terminates the protocol Sh; (b) If some honest party terminates Sh, then every honest party eventually terminates Sh; (c) If all the honest parties invoked Rec, then each honest party eventually terminates Rec.
-CORRECTNESS: If some honest party terminates Sh, then there exists a fixed value s ∈ Zp such that the following requirements hold except with a negligible probability in κ: (a) If D is honest, then s = s, and all the honest parties output s upon terminating Rec; (b) Even if D is corrupted, all the honest parties output s upon terminating Rec.
-PRIVACY: If D is honest during the protocol Sh and no honest party has started to execute the protocol Rec, then the adversary A has no information about the secret s.
Computationally Secure AMPC. We briefly review computationally secure AMPC here, and refer the readers to [30, 31] for a formal definition. Informally, in an AMPC protocol Π MPC , every party first provides its input in Zp to the computation (in a secure fashion). Due to the asynchronous nature of communication, the parties cannot wait to consider the inputs of all n parties, and instead they agree on inputs from a set CORE of n − t parties. The parties then compute an "approximation" of f on the inputs from the CORE set and assuming a default value (say 0) as the remaining t inputs. For every possible A and for all possible inputs and random coins of the (honest) parties, we expect the following properties for a Π MPC instance, except with a negligible probability in κ:
-TERMINATION: Every honest party eventually terminates the instance Π MPC .
-CORRECTNESS: Every honest party obtains the correct output of the function f .
-PRIVACY: The adversary A obtains no additional information about the inputs of the honest parties other than what may be inferred from the inputs and outputs of the corrupted parties. These properties are formalized to the standard simulation-based definition following the real-world/ideal-world paradigm [17, 31] .
(Transferable) Non-equivocation. Non-equivocation restricts a corrupted party from making conflicting statements to different parties. It has been used in several asynchronous distributed systems [21-23, 33, 34] to improve their resiliency. In particular, these systems employ transferable non-equivocation which (like digital signatures) allows a party to verifiably transfer a non-equivocation tag
The Neq mechanism Neq is parameterized by a polynomial p(·), and an implicit security parameter κ.
Setup: Upon receiving a (Setup) message from party Pi ∈ P: (or signature) provided by a sender to other parties. Clement et al. [22] justify the necessity of transferability of non-equivocation by proving that non-equivocation or signature alone are powerless in asynchronous distributed systems. Nevertheless, (transferable) non-equivocation has not been formalized so far, and we present a simplified, idealized definition for transferable non-equivocation.
In Figure 2 , we define a simplified mechanism Neq, intended to model the event for a transferable non-equivocation instantiation: (1) during the setup phase, every party Pi gets associated with a unique non-equivocation list Li characterized by its index i, and all parties are informed about this association. (2) The list owner party can create a non-equivocation signature for any key-message pair except that she cannot equivocate and obtain a signature for the same key twice. (3) Given a key-message-signature triplet associated with a sender, any party successfully verifies only correctly generated signatures except with a negligible probability.
We survey existing transferable non-equivocation instantiations and analyze their relations to Neq in the full version of the paper [1] . In most instantiations, the transferable non-equivocation is implemented using an increment-only counter for keys and signatures with public key infrastructure (PKI) [21] [22] [23] 34] or message authentication codes (MACs) generated with a replicated secret key [33] . In Neq, we generalize these using the list Li of key-message-signature triplets associated with party Pi indexed by party-defined ordered keys ℓ. Similar to signatures, only Pi can use Neq-Sign to add triplets (one per each key) to Li. Similar to PKI, anybody can Neq-Verify if a triplet ℓ, m, σ belongs to Li of Pi, and verifiably transfer authentication to others. Note that the increment-only counter provides a space-efficient way to implement a list Li as only the counter value has to be maintained and not the whole list.
For ease of exposition, we use a phrase Pi sends mσ i to Pj and Pj receives mσ i from Pi to suggest that Pi sends a triplet ℓ, m, σ ℓ,m i for a key ℓ to Pj and Pj delivers it only after applying Neq-Verify to check if σ ℓ,m i is obtained by Pi using Neq-Sign on ℓ and m. Similarly, we use a phrase Pj forwards mσ i to P k to suggest that Pj received (in the above sense) message mσ i (of Pi) from some party, and then forwards it to P k who should also (non-equivocally) receive it. Note that we avoid the keys ℓ in the above phrases as they can be pre-assigned to protocol instance-step combinations in an unambiguous manner.
Employed Primitives
Homomorphic Encryptions and Commitments: We assume an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme (Enc, Dec), which is linearly homomorphic. Every party Pi has its own key-pair (pk i , ski), for which the public key pk i is known to all parties. Given two ciphertexts cm 1 = Enc pk i (m1, ·) and cm 2 = Enc pk i (m2, ·), we require that there exist operations ⊞ and on ciphertexts such that cm 1 ⊞ cm 2 = Enc pk i (m1 +m2, ·) and a cm i = Enc pk i (a·mi, ·) holds. We also assume an unconditional hiding and computational commitment scheme (Commit, Open), which is linearly homomorphic with analogous homomorphic operations; these are denoted by ⊕ and ⊙. For the sake of readability, we sometimes leave the randomness of encryptions and commitments implicit.
For instantiating encryptions and commitments over messages in Zp, we use the encoding-free additive El-Gamal encryption scheme [19] and Pedersen commitment scheme [35] respectively. In particular, we only require that the scheme is CPA secure (Theorem 3 in [19] ) and it is not necessary that applying homomorphism twice to the same encrypted values leads to different ciphertexts.
Zero-knowledge (ZK) Proofs:
We assume the presence of the following two-party ZK protocols.
In the zero-knowledge proof of equality of encrypted and committed values (protocol PoE), there exists a prover P ∈ P who computes and publishes a commitment Comm = Commit(m, r), and ciphertexts cm = Enc pk i (m, ·) and cr = Enc pk i (r, ·). Then using PoE, the prover P can prove to any verifier V ∈ P (knowing Comm, cm, cr and pk i ) that the message encrypted in cm is also committed in Comm, under the randomness encrypted in cr; i.e., ∃m, r, r1, r2, such that
In the zero-knowledge proof of correct pre-multiplication (protocol PoCM), publicly known commitments Comv j = Commit(vj, rj) and corresponding ciphertexts cv j = Enc pk j (vj, ·) and cr j = Enc pk j (rj, ·) for j ∈ [1, n] will be available. There exists a prover P ∈ P who selects a random u ∈ Zp and t-degree random polynomials m(·) andm(·) in Zp[x] with m(0) =m(0) = 0. Let mj = m(j) andmj =m(j) for j ∈ [0, n]. In addition, P publishes Comu = Commit(u, ·) and Comm j = Commit(mj,mj). Using the homomorphic property of commitments and encryptions, P computes and publishes the commitment Comu·v j +m j = Commit (u · vj + mj, u · rj +mj) and encryptions cu·v j +m j and c u·r j +m j of u · vj + mj and u · rj +mj respectively. Then using PoCM, P can prove to any verifier V ∈ P that all values Comu·v j +m j were generated by multiplying Comv j with the same u followed by re-randomization using the same m(·) andm(·) polynomials, and that all cu·v j +m j and c u·r j +m j values were generated by multiplying cv j and cr j respectively with the same u, followed by rerandomization using the same m(·) andm(·) respectively. i.e., ∃u, ρ, m(·),m(·), {kj ,kj} j∈ [1,n] 
Both the ZK protocols are based on standard Σ-protocols [8] and have communication complexity O(κ) bits and O(nκ) bits respectively; see the extended version of the paper [1] for their instantiations based on the ZK protocols in [16] .
Certificates of Claims: Hirt, Nielsen, and Przydatek [31] introduced this concept to allow a prover P ∈ P to publicly prove correctness of a certain claim (like real-life certificates), without revealing any additional information. Here, to certify validity of a statement m, the prover P proves m to every verifier Pi ∈ P using an appropriate zero-knowledge (ZK) protocol. A verifier Pi, upon successful verification, sends a signature to P on an "appropriate" message (known publicly), corresponding to m. P cannot wait for all n signatures in the asynchronous environment; thus, upon receiving (n − t) = t + 1 signatures, the prover P concatenates them to construct a certificate α for the claim m. These t + 1 signatures ensure that at least one honest party has verified the claim, and that m is true with an overwhelming probability. Assuming each signature to be of size O(κ) bits, the size of α will be O(nκ) bits; this can be reduced to O(κ) bits using a threshold signature scheme with threshold t [7] . Here, the verifiers send signature shares and the prover P "combines" (n − t) shares to a single signature 4 . Let zkp be the ZK protocol corresponding to the claim m. We denote by α = certify zkp (m), the task of constructing a certificate α for m. Similarly we say that "Pi verifies the certificate α for the claim m" to mean that that Pi verifies that α is a valid (threshold) signature on the "appropriate message" corresponding to m. The communication cost of constructing α is the same as that of executing n instances of the corresponding ZK protocol zkp.
Reliable Broadcast (r-broadcast): This asynchronous primitive [13, 28, 39] allows a sender S to send a message m identically to all the parties: For a given instance τ b of r-broadcast, when S is honest, all honest parties eventually terminate with output (τ b , m); if S is corrupted and some honest party terminates with (τ b , m ′ ), then every honest party also eventually terminates with (τ b , m ′ ); for any instance, at most one message can be delivered by an honest party.
The resiliency bound for r-broadcast is n ≥ 3t + 1 [13, 28, 39] ; however, assuming transferable non-equivocation, an r-broadcast protocol with n ≥ t + 1 and O(n 2 (ℓ + κ)) bits of communication for broadcasting an ℓ-bit message is available [22, 23] . The highlevel idea of the protocol is as follows: S first (non-equivocally) sends mσ S to all the parties; this prevents a corrupted S from sending different messages to different honest parties. However, a corrupted S can avoid sending mσ S to some honest parties. Thus, to ensure that all the honest parties eventually receive mσ S , whenever an honest party (non-equivocally) receives some message mσ S , before delivering the message, it non-equivocally forwards it to every other party. This ensures that whenever an honest party receives mσ S then it will be eventually received by every other honest party.
In the rest of the paper, the term "Pi broadcasts m" means that Pi as a sender invokes an r-broadcast instance for m. Similarly, "Pj receives m from the broadcast of Pi" means that Pj terminates the r-broadcast instance τ b invoked by Pi with the output (τ b , m).
Agreement on a Common Subset (ACS):
This primitive allows the parties to agree on a common subset of (n − t) parties, who correctly invoked some protocol, say Π, satisfying the following requirements: (a) If an honest party invokes an instance of Π then all the (honest) parties eventually terminate the instance; (b) If some honest party terminates an instance of Π invoked by a corrupted party, then every honest party eventually does the same. ACS can be realized by executing n instances (one for each party) of an asynchronous Byzantine agreement (ABA) protocol to decide if it should be included in the common subset. Assuming transferable non-equivocation, ABA, and hence ACS, can be implemented with n ≥ 2t + 1 [22, 23, 33] . An efficient ACS protocol with expected communication complexity of O(n 3 κ) bits can be obtained by using the Neq mechanism in the multi-valued ABA of [15] .
Secret Sharing Notations
Given a secret s ∈ Zp, let φ(·), ψ(·) ∈ Zp[x] be, respectively, a degree t sharing polynomial with φ(0) = s and a t-degree randomness polynomial required for commitments; here, p is a κ-bit prime. For party Pj , sj = φ(j) and rj = ψ(j) are respectively her shares of s and the randomness polynomial. Let cs j = Enc pk j (sj , ·), cr j = Enc pk j (rj, ·) and Coms j = Commit(sj, rj) and let Coms = Commit(s, ψ(0)). We call {cs j , cr j } j∈ [1,n] the encrypted shares and {Coms j } j∈ [1,n] the committed shares of s.
[·]-sharing: A secret s is said to be [·]-shared, if every (honest) party Pi ∈ P holds si, ri, {Coms j } j∈ [1,n] and Coms 
OUR AVSS PROTOCOL
Protocols Sh and Rec presented in Figure 3 constitutes an AVSS scheme with n = 2t + 1. Protocol Sh allows a dealer D to "verifiably" generate [s] for a secret s ∈ Zp. It ensures that if the protocol terminates then there exists a value (say s) which will be [·]-shared among the parties; if D is honest then s = s, and A learns no new information on s. The protocol always terminates for an honest D and has communication complexity O(n 2 κ). Protocol Rec allows the parties to reconstruct s, given that s is [·]-shared.
In the Sh protocol, D polynomial-shares the secret s with threshold t to generate shares {sj } j∈ [1,n] and computes the commitments Coms j = Commit(sj, rj), where rj is a share of a random tdegree randomness polynomial ψ(·). It also computes the encryptions cs j = Enc pk j (sj) and cr j = Enc pk j (rj) of each share-pair sj, rj, and the commitment Coms = Commit(s, ψ(0)). D then (non-equivocally) sends {cs j }σ D , {cr j }σ D and {Coms j }σ D for all j ∈ [1, n], and {Coms}σ D to every party and claims that it has correctly [·]-shared a secret: the claim involves proving that the plaintexts in cs j and cr j are committed in Coms j and that the values committed in {Coms j } j∈ [1,n] constitute shares of the secret committed in Coms with threshold t. Note that although sending the full vector {cs j }σ D , {cr j }σ D and {Coms j }σ D to each party looks a bit non-intuitive, it is the crux of our Sh protocol to ensure that every party eventually receives its shares for [s] .
To verify D's claim, upon (non-equivocally) receiving information from D, every Pi verifies if the committed shares {Coms j } j∈ [1,n] constitute Shamir sharing of the secret committed in Coms with threshold t. For this, the parties use the fact that given the commitments to at least t + 1 distinct points on a t degree polynomial, it is possible to (homomorphically) compute the commitments of the coefficients of the polynomial [14, 26] . In particular, party Pi takes Coms along with {Coms j } j∈ [1,t] and homomorphically computes the commitments of the sharing and randomness polynomial. Using these commitments, party Pi then computes the commitments of the remaining n − t points and matches them with {Coms j } j∈[t+1,n] . Additionally Pi engages in n instances of PoE (one per triplet {cs j , cr j , Coms j }) with D. By non-equivocally sending messages to the parties, it is ensured that the parties who receive the messages from D, receive the same messages. D then Protocol Sh (D, τ, s) : τ is the session id I. D-Dependent Phase:
Share Computation and Certificate Generation-Given the secret s ∈ Zp, D executes the following code: 1. Select t-degree polynomials φ(·), ψ(·) with φ(0) = s. For j ∈ [1, n], compute share-pairs sj = φ(j), rj = ψ(j), ciphertexts cs j = Enc pk j (sj), cr j = Enc pk j (rj) and committed share Coms j = Commit(sj, rj). Compute Coms = Commit(s, ψ (0) Protocol Rec(D, τ, [s]): τ is the session id Every party Pi ∈ P executes the following code:
1. Send the share-pair (si, ri) to every party Pj ∈ P.
2. On receiving the share-pair (sj, rj) from party Pj , verify whether Coms j ? = Commit(sj , rj). If the verification is successful, then include sj in a set Tj , initialized to ∅. 3. Once |Tj | = t + 1, construct a t-degree polynomial φ(·) by interpolating the points {(j, sj)}s j ∈T j . Output s = φ(0) and terminate. A valid certificate from D does not ensure that every (honest) Pi will eventually hold its information corresponding to [s]: due to asynchrony or possible corrupted behavior of D, t honest parties may not receive their shares corresponding to [s]. We solve this problem by using two additional "rounds" of communication, which we call the D-independent phase. Each privileged party nonequivocally forwards only {cs j }σ D , {cr j }σ D , and {Coms j }σ D to every party Pj , who can decrypt cs j and cr j to obtain sj, rj. Existence of at least one honest privileged party ensures that every Pj eventually receives sj, rj and Coms j . Next, every Pi forwards {Coms i }σ D to all parties. As all t + 1 honest parties would eventually receive their respective {cs i }σ D , {cr i }σ D , and {Coms i }σ D messages at the end of first "round" of the D-independent phase, eventually every honest party will receive t + 1 forwarded committed shares. Now using the homomorphic property of commitments every party can compute the remaining committed shares and Coms, thus possessing all the necessary information of [s].
Given [s] generated using Sh, protocol Rec is based on the standard reconstruction protocol used in the existing computationally secure AVSS [3, 14] , which allows the parties to robustly reconstruct s. In the protocol, each party sends its share-pair to all the parties, which are verified with the corresponding commitment, available with the parties (as part of [s]). Once t + 1 "correct" share pairs are received, the sharing polynomial, and hence s, is reconstructed. As there exist at least t+1 honest parties whose shares will eventually be communicated among themselves, the Rec protocol eventually terminates. As stated in Lemma 4.1. the pair of protocols (Sh, Rec) constitutes an AVSS scheme with n = 2t + 1 and communication complexity O(n 2 κ) bits. Due to space constraints, the proof is shifted to the extended version [1] . LEMMA 4.1. Protocols (Sh, Rec) constitute a computational secure AVSS scheme tolerating t < n/2 corruptions, where both Sh and Rec incur communication cost of O(n 2 κ) bits.
Notice that the above AVSS scheme is also publicly verifiable [38] as any third party can verify the consistency of the shares using the valid certificate broadcasted by D. Commitment to Shares instead of Polynomial Coefficients during Sh: In most existing computational secure VSS schemes [3, 35] , D commits to the polynomial coefficients of sharing and randomness polynomials during the sharing phase, and the parties homomorphically generates the committed shares from those. This approach makes VSS simpler as the parties are not required to verify whether the committed shares lie on degree t polynomial.
If we follow this approach in our Sh protocol, then D has to nonequivocally distribute the commitment to polynomial coefficients of the sharing and randomness polynomials. In that case, however, the homomorphically generated committed shares will not have the necessary non-equivocation tag as the non-equivocation mechanism is not required to be homomorphic in nature. As a result, a corrupted privileged party can forward some incorrect committed shares to the respective parties during the D-independent phase, and the correctness of the protocol. Although the privileged parties can be asked to non-equivocally forward the polynomial coefficients during the D-independent phase, and it will result in an additional Θ(n) communication overhead.
Protocol Sup-PreMul-Sh(D, τ, P king , P, [v]): τ is the session id Let {cv j , cr j , Comv j = Commit(vj, rj)} j∈ [1,n] and Comv = Commit(v, ·) be information corresponding to [v] available to all parties; I. Generating [u]: On having a value u, D invokes an instance Sup-Sh(D, τ, P king , u) of Sup-Sh to generate [u] under the supervision of P king and every party in P participates in this instance and wait for its termination. Let Comu = Commit(u, ·) be the commitment of u which is computed and communicated during this instance of Sup-Sh (along with the other information corresponding to 
For this, run an instance of PoCM for ({cv j , cr j , Comv j , cu·v j +m j , c u·r j +m j , Comu·v j +m j , Comm j } j∈ [1,n] , Comu, Comm) with every party Pi. Broadcast the certificate β D,τ once it is constructed. 2. Share Verification and Certification-Every Pi ∈ P upon receiving {cu·v j +m j }σ D , {c On receiving t + 1 {Comu·v i +m i }σ D messages, homomorphically compute {Comu·v j +m j } j∈ [1,n] , Comu·v and terminate. 
SUPERVISED SHARING PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present two protocols for generating [·]-sharings with different properties under the supervision of a king P king . Here, if the protocols terminate, then an honest P king will be a privileged party with respect to the generated sharings.
Protocol Sup-Sh: Supervised [·]-sharing
In our first supervised sharing protocol Sup-Sh, a dealer D verifiably generates [s] for a secret s under the supervision of P king ∈ P. If the protocol terminates then there exists a value (say s) which will be [·]-shared among the parties; if D is honest then s = s, and A learns no new information on s from the protocol execution. Moreover, if P king is honest then it will be a privileged party. The protocol always terminates for an honest D and P king and has communication complexity O(n 2 κ). We obtain protocol Sup-Sh by adding two small verification steps during the D-dependent phase in the protocol Sh in Figure 3 . Specifically, in the term of properties Sup-Sh is the same as Sh, with the additional requirement that P king is a privileged party. To ensure the same, in protocol Sh, during the D-dependent phase, we ask P king to broadcast an "acknowledgement" (a special message) after verifying the claim of D during the D-dependent phase. Additionally, we enforce that every party should this receive acknowledgement from P king , before proceeding further. As an honest P king will broadcast the acknowledgement only after verifying the claim of D, these additional steps ensure that indeed P king will be a privileged party. To avoid repetition, we avoid giving the complete formal details of Sup-Sh and instead state the following lemma. The proof follows from the proof of Lemma 4.1 and the above discussion (for details, see [1] 
Supervised Pre-multiplication Protocol
The Sup-PreMul-Sh protocol (Figure 4) [1,n] and Comv be the encrypted shares and the committed shares corresponding to [v] that is available to all the parties. Let φ(·) and ψ(·) be the sharing and randomness polynomial corresponding to [v] . Thus vi = φ(i), ri = ψ(i) is the share-pair available with Pi and cv j = Enc pk j (vj), cr j = Enc pk j (rj), Comv j = Commit(vj , rj) and Comv = Commit( φ(0), ψ(0)). The rest of the protocol is now similar to Sup-Sh, except that PoCM is used instead of PoE by D to construct the certificate that it has done "correct pre-multiplication". As nothing about the masking polynomials is revealed, u remains private. The properties of the protocol are stated in Lemma 5.2, with the proofs being shifted to [1] 
SUPERVISED TRIPLE GENERATION
Generating the Second Component
Sup-Second generates [v] for a uniformly random and private value v, under the supervision of P king . For a requirement clarified in the sequel, Sup-Second also ensures that each party becomes a privileged party with respect to [v] . In the protocol, each Pi invokes an instance Sup-Shi of Sup-Sh (as a D) to generate [v (i) ] for a uniformly random v (i) . Let T king be the set of first t + 1 parties whose instance of Sup-Sh is terminated by P king , and let v = P k ∈T king v (k) . As at least one party in T king is honest, v is uniformly random and private. Next, P king broadcasts T king and every party waits until it terminates all Sup-Sh k instances of P k ∈ T king ; this ensures that every party obtains its share-pair and committed shares of v.
As P king is privileged for every [v (k) ], it computes all encrypted shares of [v] , using the homomorphic property of encryptions. However, unlike P king , other honest parties may be non-privileged for one or more [v (k) ]s, and thus may not compute the encrypted shares of [v] . The way out is that P king "helps" other parties by broadcasting the encrypted shares of v, which costs O(n 3 κ) bits. To confirm whether P king indeed broadcasted the correct encrypted shares of v, P king is also asked to non-equivocally forward the encrypted shares corresponding to each [v (k) ] to every other party. We stress that this information is not broadcasted, and rather communicated over the point-to-point channels, which costs O(n 3 κ) bits. Once this information is non-equivocally received by a party, it re-computes the encrypted shares of v, verifies them with the P king 's broadcast, and broadcasts the verification result. If t + 1 parties broadcasts "positively" for P king , then at least one honest party must have successfully verified those encrypted shares; so every party terminates the protocol with [v] and the broadcasted encrypted shares of [v] . The properties of the Sup-Second protocol are stated in Lemma 6.1. 
where T king is the set of t + 1 parties P k such that the instance Sup-PreMul-Sh k has been terminated by P king . 
